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ABSTRACT 
This project implements a Multi-Level Security (MLS) lattice model 
framework based on a graph database by creating and testing the the Bell-
LaPadula access control environment within it. The graph database (Neo4j) is 
used as a tool to implement MLS policy by leveraging Bell-LaPadula security 
principles and the MLS lattice model. After verifying that the MLS lattice model is 
correctly expressed in the graph database, a formal framework in which Bell-
LaPadula security principles is applied to track the information flow within a 
single domain. Finally, we extend and enhance the formal framework so that a 
MLS security access control policy can be specified for the MLS multi-domain 
environment. With the new enhanced model, we are able to perform a query to 
verify if the subject in one domain can access to the object in another domain 
while the two domains are connected through a trust relationship. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Research Motivation 
Information security remains as a critical component not only for private 
sectors but government as well. This is evident by examining the grave effects on 
cases such as the breach that happened to Marriott (Sanger et al., 2018) as well 
as the US Office of Personnel Management (Davis, 2015; Koerner, 2016) and the 
interference of the presidential election in 2016 (“2016 Presidential Campaign 
Hacking Fast Facts”, 2019). To protect the distributed systems from attacks such 
as these in the government, cybersecurity professionals rely heavily on detailed 
security standards, policy, and guidelines. Furthermore these standards, policies, 
and guidelines, such as the ones in the Risk Management Framework, are 
mandated by the E-Government Act (2002), Federal Information Security 
Management Act (2002), and Federal Information Security Modernization Act 
(2014) as there is a need to develop baseline for government work processes 
and systems (Ross et al., 2020). 
Besides the Risk Management Framework that is adopted throughout the 
federal government, the public sector also utilizes Multi-Level Security (MLS) 
policies in order to only enable authorized personnel, systems, or processes to 
access the resources that are deemed sensitive. To fully utilize MLS policy, 
access control principles must be utilized known as the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) may 
be utilized. A lattice model by (Denning, 1976) represents such policies in an 
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abstracted view through vertices and edges and we are aware of the existence of 
the graph database that may take advantage of such structure. Therefore, these 
questions came to mind: 
• Can the MLS policies be expressed in a graph database? 
• Can information leaks be identified through the graph database? 
• Can we query if one subject can access another object in another 
domain? 
• What are possible byproducts of this research? 
According to Cram et al., 2017, the overall quality of the policy is 
influenced by its brevity (e.g., length), clarity (e.g., ease of understanding), and 
breadth (e.g., level of guidance on violation ramification), leading us to believe 
that the security policies may be liable to be interpreted differently from the 
writer’s original intentions. Even a weakness in one the three mentioned 
categories may present a difficulty when it comes time to implement the policies 
when it is viewed by security practitioners which may lead to an information leak. 
Such important policies may be represented visually to provide a common 
ground for security policy writers and security practitioners using a graph 
database. 
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Organization 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2, literature 
and concepts studied in the past are reviewed. Chapter 3 implements the MLS 
lattice model and explore potentials in the graph database. Chapter 4 presents 
how information leaks may be identified between MLS multiple domains with a 
pre-defined information sharing agreement by leveraging BLP security principles 
in the database. Chapter 5 shows our extended framework which allows us to 
verify if the subject in one domain can access to the object in another domain in 
a MLS cross-domain environment. Chapter 6 contains the conclusion and future 
work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND 
Multi-Level Security 
The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) Model is used to address Multi-Level Security 
(MLS) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC). MAC (Examples 1 & 2) is a method 
on limiting the access of an object from a subject, based on the sensitivity of the 
data along with a need-to-know requirement. There is also the BLP Model (Bell, 
2005) which restricts the flow of information to only flow upwards from a lower 
security label to a higher security label to mitigate compromising confidentiality of 
the information Panossian, 2019. A past research has been conducted to formally 
render Multi-Level Security (MLS) structure as a lattice model (Denning, 1976) 
shown in Figure 2.1 which specifies the BLP properties. The MLS is used widely 
from the federal departments in the United States government as well as third-
party defense contracting industries to allow access to sensitive information 
(Panossian, 2019). The lattice model’s structure is formed with vertices 
connected by edges. Figure 2.1 also distinguished two sets of vertices with 
different colors by their levels. Vertices that cover the red area are labeled as top 
secret or “TS” and vertices that cover the orange area are labeled as secret or 
“S”. 
13 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Lattice Model 
Security labels (𝑆𝐿(𝑆𝑖, 𝐶𝑖)) consist of two components. The first 
component is a sensitivity level (Example 1). Sensitivity level has a range from 
“Unclassified” to “Classified” to “Secret” and “Top Secret” and countries and 
organizations have a similar hierarchy structures which are associated by the risk 
of the information being exposed (Focardi & Gorrieri, 2003). 
 
Example 1. Based on Figure 2.1, TS {} is a considered a higher classification 
than S {} or TS {} ≥ S {}. Therefore, TS {} is able to read from S {} and S {} can 
write to TS {}, allowing information to flow from a lower classification to a higher 
classification. At the same time, TS {} cannot write down to S {} nor can S {} read 
up to TS {}, for this would allow information to flow in reverse. The 
implementation rules are discussed are portrayed in Figure 2.2 (Denning, 1976; 
Panossian, 2019). 
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The second component is based on the need-to-know component (c) 
known as compartments (Example 2). Every sensitivity level will be associated 
with a set of compartments to detail the security label an entity has in 
possession. 
 
Example 2. Based on Figure 2.1, TS {} cannot read from or write to S {Nuke}. 
Although the Top Secret classification (TS {}) is higher than the Secret 
classification (S {Nuke}) similar to Example 1, TS {} does not have the need to 
know as it lacks the {Nuke} compartment. This is the second criteria that needs 
to be formally satisfied as SL(Si,Ci) ⊇ SL(Sj,Ck), which is not satisfied in this 
example. By creating compartments, such as {Nuke} or {Bio}, access becomes 
much more restrictive, as if there is another layer of security. Simply having the 
highest security clearance will not grant a user access to everything (Denning, 
1976; Panossian, 2019). 
 
With the two components, there is a criteria each component must 
indefinitely satisfy for two objects to be comparable and decide one set of 
security label to dominate the other security label SL(Si,Ci) ≥SL SL(sj, ck) 
(Focardi & Gorrieri, 2003; Son, 2008). Such labels such as SL(Si,Cj) is 
interchangeable with SL(TS {Bio,Chem}) or SL(TS, {Bio,Chem}).In order to 
provide one security label dominates another is if and only if SL(Si) ≥SL SL(Sj) 
and SL(Ci) ⊇SL SL(Cj), however, if SL(Ci) is {} then it could be just considered as 
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SL(Si) or Si. When the two are compared and the relationship between the two 
objects are proven, BLP security conditions are applied to complete the multi-
level security concept which is represented in the lattice model. 
In order for the two security labels to be comparable the two criteria 
implied on MAC must be met as shown above (Examples 1 & 2). However, to 
prevent information from leaking, the two security properties from the BLP 
models need to be met. Those two essential security properties are: simple 
security property and star property. Together the two properties ensure 
information flows from low to high (Figure 2.2). The security policies are built 
around the concept of subjects (s) and objects (o). 
 
Figure 2.2: Information Flow with BLP 
 
Simple security property Simultaneously known as the “no read up” states that 
a subject with a security label may not read an object with a comparably higher 
security label. In other words, a subject (s) may read object (o) if the security 
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label (SL) of the object is less than or equal to the level of the subject (Bell, 
2005). 
SL(s) ≥SL SL(o) 
 
Example 3. Assuming a person (s) has the security clearance S {Bio}, si cannot 
read oi (with the classification TS {Bio, Nuke}), as the security classification for oi 
is higher than the clearance si has. However, si can read the object o j (with the 
classification S {Bio}), as SL(si) ≥SL SL(oj). Furthermore, person A should also 
be able to read ok (with the classification S {}). 
 
(star) property Simultaneously known as the “no write down” states that a 
subject with a given security level may not write to any objects with a lower 
security level. Therefore, the subject (s) may write to the object (o) if the security 
label (SL) of the subject is less than or equal to the level of the object (Bell, 
2005). 
 
SL(s) ≤SL SL(o) 
 
Example 4. Assuming every variable has the same security label as shown in 
Example 3, person (si) can now write to oi, as the security classification is higher 
than person A’s clearance. However, person A will not be able to write to o j as 
well as ok, due to o j and ok having a lower security classification compared to 
the security label si has. 
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Multi-Level Security Modeling Using a Graph Database 
 
The concept of graphs dates all the way back to the early 18th century, 
where Leohard Euler set the groundwork for the mathematics and graph theory 
(Needham & Hodler, 2019). While graphs originated in mathematics, graphs are 
pragmatic tools to model and analyze data. A graph consists of two elements: 
vertices and edges. Connecting two vertices representing an entity with an edge 
will form a graphical relationship as shown in Figure 2.3. The simple graph 
shown in Figure 2.3 can form a couple sentences that provide the intended 
information. By observing Figure 2.3, it is possible to convey the graph into an 
information “John drives the blue car that his employer, the MLS Company, 
provides him.” A simple pragmatic concept such as this increases the potential of 
a graph database in designing and expressing access control models. The 
design itself focuses on relationships and it does not utilize any expensive JOIN 
operations that SQL database utilizes to compute relationships (Sasaki, 2018). 
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Figure 2.3: A Graph Database Example 
 
 
Neo4j: Nodes, Relationships, and Graph Algorithms 
 
Neo4j is a graph database that supports transactional and analytical 
processsing of graph data (Needham & Hodler, 2019). It was selected because it 
uses an easy to learn ASCII based commands and comes with integrated tools 
that provides effective access different uses. In Neo4j, the two essential 
elements that make a graph are represented as nodes (vertices) and 
relationships (edges) in the database. In graph database models, nodes store 
data about an object while relationships convey data about the relevance 
between the two objects. Labels and attributes are another construct that Neo4j 
utilizes to build more precise models. Graph databases enable grouping of the 
nodes and clarification of relationships through labels. Attributes are used to 
detail or uniquely identify the nodes and to add numerical measures on a 
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relationship. The four constructs mentioned could build a comprehensive model 
to mention details that may be missed out on abstract diagrams. 
There is one constraint when developing a model, all relationships are 
unidirectional therefore the direction of the relationship must be specified, 
however, a bidirectional relationship could be conveyed through a symmetric 
relationship. A case study by Noel et al., 2016 portrayed a similar relationship 
utilizing a symmetric relationship when identifying the security postures of 
networked systems. According to Crawford, 2016, in order for two arbitrary node 
x and y, with the sorted pairs of (x, y) and (y, x) the direction of the relationship 
could be oriented in two different directions. For example, when attempting to 
convey an established trust relationship that we see in two different domains in 
Figure 2.4, Dx labels the relationship to Dy as [:TRUSTS] in Figure 2.4 (a) and the 
same relationship could be conveyed back by labeling Dy to have the [: T RU 
STS] relationship as system Dx as shown in Figure 2.4(b). By adding examples of 
(a) and (b), a symmetric [:TRUSTS] relationship can be formed between node Dx 
and Dy shown in Figure 2.4(c) to represent two nodes trusting each other. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Examples of Directed Graphs 
 
The Neo4j database comes with built in algorithms to analyze graphical 
representation of physical models. The three algorithms used are path finding, 
20 
 
centrality, and community detection algorithm (Needham & Hodler, 2019). After 
use cases of each algorithms are explored, one algorithm is experimented with 
the database: path finding algorithm. Path finding algorithm is built on top of a 
graph search algorithm in the database. Path finding algorithms are utilized to 
identify optimal routes in a graph which requires quantitative values to be 
assigned to each relationship. Without such quantitative value on relationships, 
path finding algorithm could not be fully utilized but an alternative search and log 
query was generated which was originally intended to store results a minimum 
spanning tree algorithm. The custom query will be utilized in Chapter 3 to 
observe all paths within the MLS lattice model. 
 
Utilization of Graph Database for Access Control Modeling 
 
Graph databases have been researched mainly in Role-Based Access 
Control (RBAC) models (Alves & Fernández, 2017; Wahane, 2017; Morgado et al., 
2018; Jin & Kaja, 2019). While there are few seminal works that utilize the MAC 
model (Yixin Jiang etal., 2004; Crawford, 2016), this project used the seminal 
work by Jin and Kaja, 2019, to formulate the problem. In the previous work’s 
instance, access control was implemented specifying controls for a RBAC 
through XACML using a graph database. By pre-defining access control in 
XACML, it allowed explicit access control decisions to be presentedin a graph 
database. An XACML implementation was indicated to be one approach to 
enforcing the read and write rules within the MLS Lattice structure. However, 
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XACML is not needed to produce an induced relationship between nodes in a 
MLS lattice model. Producing a graph-based access control framework on 
several well-known access control models (MAC, DAC, RBAC) was also 
researched by (Koch et al., 2005) which also helped model relationships between 
the MLS model and entities that are bound to the model. Graph database has 
also been utilized to research network attack relationships utilizing various 
sources of aggregated data by (Noel et al., 2016). 
 
XACML and Graph Database This architecture allows to form an induced 
relationship between nodes that are indirectly connected relationships through 
traversing relationships and constraints defined through XACML. The concept 
pairs well with organizations with no need for an abstract structure between a 
subject and an object. When a subject requests access to an object, the path is 
queried through the database, but the policy written in XACML compares the 
constraints set on the object with the subject’s attributes and then decides to 
grant or deny access to the object (Figure2.5). One disadvantage to this 
implementation is that all the different combination of attributes in subject to 
object access and the change in the entities’ attribute in different times must be 
accounted for. 
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Figure 2.5: Example XACML Based Implementation 
 
 
Example 5. Assuming a person (si) node in Figure 2.5 had an attribute with a 
“Department: Research” and requests access to an object (Files) which belongs 
to another research node (oi) and an initial policy in XACML grants access to 
everyone in the research department. Therefore, since the attributes do match, 
the request to access the object belonging to the research department will be 
permitted and an induced relationship is formed where the subject can access 
files belonging to the research department. 
 
Example 6. Assuming the same person (si) node in Figure 2.5 had an attribute 
with a “Department: Research” and requests access to a file (o j) which belongs 
to another department (Logistics) and a policy in XACML denies access to 
everyone in the not within the logistics department. Therefore, since the 
attributes do not match, the request to access the object belonging to the 
research department will be denied and no relationship is formed between the 
subject (Person) node and object (Logistics) node. 
  
 
 
 Logistics 
 
 
XACML: 
Granted 
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CHAPTER THREE 
GRAPH DATABASE FOR SPECIFYING MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY LATTICE 
Creation of Lattice Model Inside a Graph Database 
This chapter will verify the usability of graph database to express MLS 
through two experiments. Afterward, logs of the path it takes to present all 
available paths within the MLS lattice model will be observed through a 
supplemental Cypher query for path finding algorithms. Throughout the chapter 
transitive properties will be applied to formally prove security label (a) will 
dominate another security label (b) by traversing through pre-defined 
relationships. The test will be conducted through the lattice model expressed in 
the Neo4j graph database shown in Figure 3.1. To create this model, each 
security label node was created with three attributes: UID, sensitivityLevel, and 
Compartment. Furthermore, each node representing a security label has a one-
directional relationship pointing away, labeled as “[:DOMINATES]”, towards 
another node to signify it has a higher security label than the other label. The 
MLS model in Figure 3.1 was created with the Cypher. 
 
• Create Security Labels 
CREATE (:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio, Nuke’, UID: 
‘TS {Bio, Nuke}’}), 
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(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio’, UID: ‘TS {Bio}’}), 
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’, compartment: ‘Nuke’, UID: ‘TS {Nuke}’}), 
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’, compartment: ‘ ’, UID: ‘TS { }’}), 
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio, Nuke’, UID: ‘S {Bio, 
Nuke}’}), 
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio’, UID: ‘S {Bio}’}),  
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, compartment: ‘Nuke’, UID: ‘S {Nuke}’}), 
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, compartment: ‘ ’, UID: ‘S { }’}); 
 
• Create Relationship with Same Compartment and Lower Level of 
Clearance  
MATCH (h:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’}), (l:Label { sensitivityLevel: 
‘Secret’}) 
WHERE h.compartment = l.compartment CREATE (h)-[rel:DOMINATES]->(l); 
 
• Create Relationship with Subset of Compartments 
MATCH (h:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio, Nuke’}), 
(l:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’}) 
WHERE l.compartment = ‘Bio’ or l.compartment = ‘Nuke’ CREATE (h)-
[rel:DOMINATES]->(l); 
MATCH (h:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’}),(l:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top 
Secret’, compartment: ‘ ’}) 
25 
 
WHERE h.compartment = ‘Bio’ or h.compartment = ‘Nuke’ CREATE (h)-
[rel:DOMINATES]->(l); 
MATCH (h:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio, Nuke’}), (l:Label 
{sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’}) 
CREATE (h)-[rel:DOMINATES]->(l); 
MATCH (h:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’}),(l:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, 
compartment: ‘ ’}) 
CREATE (h)-[rel:DOMINATES]->(l); 
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Figure 3.1: MLS Model in Graph Database 
 
The following two test scenarios involve Cypher queries with an explicitly 
defined destination that are utilized to verify if the lattice model is correctly 
represented in the graph database. Furthermore, an example utilizing a 
supplemental query used to log the paths in path finding algorithms to explain the 
dominating relationships between the security labels will be observed in the next 
section to supplement the statements made in this section. 
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Scenario 1 (Comparable Security Labels) 
The following test scenario queries paths with a set destination which 
satisfies the two criteria in order for two security label in a MLS structure to be 
comparable, SL(Si,Ci) ≥ SL(Sj,Ck) and SL(Si,Ci) ⊇ SL(Sj,Cj). In this test, the 
following Cypher query has been utilized to provide the result in Figure 3.2. 
MATCH path=(h:Label {UID: 'TS_{Bio}'})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: 'S_{ }'})  
RETURN path; 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Comparable Query Result 
 
In this instance of the Cypher query, it rendered the path from TS {Bio} 
node to S {} node, which provide two paths it took to reach the final node. While 
the query satisfies both criteria demonstrated from Example 1 and Example 2, 
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the test showed that TS {Bio} is a higher classification than S {} by implying the 
transitive property. Transitive Property holds: 
 
SL(Si,Ci) ≥SL SL(Sj,Cj) and SL(Sj,Cj) ≥SL SL(Sk,Ck) ⇒  
SL(Si,Ci) ≥SL SL(Sk,Ck) 
In this test, TS {Bio} did not indicate that the node was directly a higher 
classification, but it indicated its dominance through the TS {} and S {Bio} nodes. 
Therefore, this test confirmed TS {Bio} ≥ S {} through graph traversal in the 
database. Since the two security labels are comparable, BLP security conditions 
are satisfied in this comparison.Therefore, subjects with TS {Bio} will be able to 
read down to objects with TS {}, S {Bio}, and S {}. Additionally, subjects with 
S {} can write up to objects with S {Bio}, TS {}, and TS {Bio}. 
Scenario 2 (Incomparable Security Labels) 
The following test scenario queries paths with a set destination which 
satisfies only one criteria (Si ≥ S j), while dissatisfying the other criteria (Si f}_ S j); 
which should result in two security labels in the MLS structure to be 
incomparable. In this test, the following Cypher query was utilized but no results 
were returned (Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3: Incomparable Query Result 
 
In this instance of the Cypher query, it attempted to query paths from TS 
{Bio} to TS {Nuke}. From observing the Figure 3.3, the graph database 
determined there was no logical path to reach from TS {Bio} to TS {Nuke}, 
therefore it ran the query but there was no graphical output. This, however, 
indicates a good sign. This test ensures no technical security violation to occur 
when comparing MAC criteria inside the graph database’s MLS model. Since the 
two security labels are incomparable, the BLP security conditions can not be 
applied. Therefore, the subjects with a TS {Bio} cannot read or write to objects 
with TS {Nuke} nor can subjects with TS {Nuke} be able to read or write to 
objects with TS {Bio}. 
Observing All Paths within Graphical MLS 
Graph databases allow queries to render the shortest path by utilizing the 
path finding algorithm, which can be installed as a plug-in. However, since the 
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default path finding algorithm requires a numerical weight on the relationship to 
display the shortest path, a custom query was required. Two queries can be 
performed to observe how a graph traverses through relationships in this case. A 
query can be performed to display all nodes that a TS {Bio, Nuke} node 
dominates in the database, which will output the same image as Figure 3.1. 
Another query can be performed to log all the source and destination node while 
traversing to its final destination, which was also intended to compliment the path 
finding algorithm. To better supplement the statements in Test Scenario 2 and 
observe how the database makes its inference with the MLS structure 
(Figure3.4), the secondary query will be performed. 
 
MATCH path=(h:Label {UID: 'TS_{Bio, Nuke}'})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label) WITH 
relationships(path) AS rels UNWIND rels AS rel with DISTINCT rel AS rel  
Return startNODE(rel).UID AS source, endNODE(rel).UID AS destination; 
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Figure 3.4: All Logical Paths 
 
The custom query requested the database to output all the nodes which 
the TS {Bio, Nuke} can reach. Furthermore, the query requested logs of the 
source and destination node to be displayed as query traverses in the graph. By 
analyzing Figure 3.4, it is shows on how the node with the highest security label 
reaches the lowest security label through different paths. Additionally, query can 
be seen going back to the point where there was a split point to reach another 
destination. After observing the logs, no paths were shown where a lower 
security label dominated a higher label or two pairs of security labels becoming 
associated with one another through transitive property. This conclusion confirms 
that policies could be enforced and queried through the database. Instead of 
relying on another mark up language to explicitly specify the rules, the rules 
could be adopted and visualized through the database. 
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Verification of MLS Structure with BLP Policy 
After observing the compliance with the MAC criterias in the database, 
BLP security policies were explicitly enforced. During the assignment process, it 
was realized that the graph database can make a logical inference with the MLS 
lattice model (Figure 3.5). When attempting to create relationships, the 
relationships were made individually and in compliance with the MAC criterias 
from the source node with the destination nodes. The Cypher command 
(Example 7) was written to make a [:CAN READ] relationship from a higher 
security label to a lower security label that had a “DOMINATES” relationship 
starting from the T S {Bio, Nuke} node. To verify the logical inference made with 
MLS has maintained the integrity of the design to only allow compartments with a 
need to know basis, a second Cypher statement was generated in Example 8. 
After the tests were conducted, the database applied all read and write policies 
and served as a granular MLS auditing tool for at least a single domain. 
 
EXAMPLE 7. 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: 'TS_(Bio, Nuke)'})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)  
CREATE (h)-[:CAN_READ]->(l); 
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Figure 3.5: Proof of Logical Inference 
 
The TS {Bio, Nuke} was expected to make an indirect relationships 
through establishing [:CAN READ] relationship with the TS {Bio} node, then the 
TS {Bio} node to make a [:CAN READ] relationship with the S {Bio} in the order 
of TS {Bio, Nuke} > TS {Bio} S {Bio}. However, TS {Bio, Nuke} has made a direct 
connection, where it can also count the number of paths to reach the S {} node. 
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Example 8. 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: 'TS_(Bio, Nuke)'})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)  
CREATE (h)-[:CAN_READ]->(l); 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Proof of Logical Inference 
 
For this example, A match and create statement was used, similar to 
Example 7. For this instance, however, it was to observe whether the database 
will create [:CAN READ] relationship with another security label. This match and 
create statement start from the TS {Bio} node to observe whether it created the 
read down relationship with incomparable nodes or observe violation of the 
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simple security model (BLP: no read up) such as TS {Bio, Nuke}, TS {Nuke}, S 
{Bio, Nuke} or S {Nuke}. As it shows in Figure 3.6, no violations were observed 
and the integrity of the MLS and BLP policies were maintained. 
MLS Graph with BLP Implementation in Single Domain 
After verifying the MLS structure can properly apply access control policy 
through applying the the simple security property, the star security property of 
BLP was applied in the MLS Model in the database. The following is the Cypher 
command used to generate the full implementation of BLP security principles 
expressed in the graph database (Figure 3.7). The inferred relationships shown in 
Figure 3.7 represented in the database as a [CAN READ] or [CAN WRITE], also 
indicates the possibility of subjects and objects to directly make read and write 
relationships when attached to the model. This will allow the database to formally 
map access control policies in an intra-domain environment and an evidence of 
autonomy when another domain is attached to this model. 
• Implement Simple Security Property 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘TS {Bio, Nuke}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)  
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l); 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘TS {Bio}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)  
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l); 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘TS {Nuke}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)  
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l); 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘TS { }’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label) 
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CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l); 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘S {Bio, Nuke}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)  
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l); 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘S {Bio}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)  
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l); 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘S {Nuke}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)  
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l); 
 
• Implement Star Security Property 
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘S { }’})  
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h); 
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘S {Bio}’})  
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h); 
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘S {Nuke}’})  
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h); 
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID:‘S {Bio, Nuke}’})  
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h); 
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘TS { }’})  
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h); 
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘TS {Bio}’})  
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h); 
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘ {Nuke}’})  
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CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h); 
 
Figure 3.7: MLS with Applied BLP Principles 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN MULTI-DOMAIN MLS STRUCTURE 
Information Flow Through Multi-Domains 
For multiple domains to collaborate with one another (share and edit 
confidential files), a mutual trust must be established. There are two steps to 
establishing trust between multiple domains. The initial step is to identify and 
specify the security labels that each domain will utilize to form a relationship 
between the two domains. The following step is to agree upon the nature of the 
trust between the two domains. Afterwards, security violations will be identified 
from observing if a loop of information flow has been formalized through the trust 
relationships. As a starting point, another domain (DCDC) was created to test 
inter-domain collaboration test scenarios. For simplicity, the domains have been 
abstracted and depicted in Figure 4.1. The group of objects in the left represent 
the DCDC and the group of objects in the right represent the DArmy. Furthermore, 
the information flow observed in the tests are used to identify information leaks 
created from various [:DOMINATES] and various [:TRUSTS*] relationships 
(Figure 4.2) in the graph. 
In a single domain, information flow has an inverse relationship to the 
[:DOMINATES] relationship in the graph. For example, if a higher security label 
dominates a lower security label, the information flow will start from lower 
security label and end in the higher security label. The result in Figure 4.1 was 
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created by inputting a cypher statement which creates a information flow in 
accordance with the [:DOMINATES] relationship: 
MATCH (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES]->(l:Label)  
CREATE (l)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(h); 
 
Figure 4.1: Second Abstract Domain 
 
The final step is to determine and agree upon the nature of the trust 
(partial or full trust and one-way or two-way). This allows inter-domain mapping 
and allow cooperation between two domains. In Figure 4.2, a matrix was 
formulated to show the nature of trust a two domain can have in a one-way 
relationship. Furthermore, the information flow of each one way trust has been 
labeled in a green arrow based on the type of trust relationship. As it is shown in 
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Figure 4.2, [:INFORMATION FLOW] relationship will be created accordingly with 
how the [:TRUSTS*] relationships has been mapped in the multi-domain setting 
in the database. The test scenarios are based on a prior work domain mapping 
example by Panossian, 2019 and will analyze the flow of information to detect an 
information leak. 
 
Figure 4.2: One-Way Trust Matrix 
 
Test Scenario 1 (One-Way Full Trust) 
One-way, full trust (read/write) relationship was created in the graph 
database to depict an incorrect inter-domain relationship (Figure 4.3) to observe 
the information flow. As a result of this incorrect mapping: 
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• DArmy Unclassi f ied is able to read from DCDC High 
• DArmy Unclassie f ed is able to write to DCDC High 
• DArmy Top Secret is able to read from DCDC Low 
• DArmy Top Secret is able to write to DCDC Low 
The following Cypher statement was utilized to simulate the inter-domain 
relationships and information flows: 
• Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC High to DArmy Unclassified  
MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘High’}), (d2:Label {UID: ‘Unclassified’})  
CREATE (d1)-[:FULLY TRUSTS ONE WAY]->(d2); 
• Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC Low to DArmy Top Secret  
MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘Low’}), (d2:Label {UID: ‘TS’})  
CREATE (d1)-[:FULLY TRUSTS ONE WAY]->(d2); 
• Create Information Flow Between DCDC and DArmy by Utilizing The 
Wrong Mapping  
MATCH (d1:Label)-[:Fully TRUSTS ONE WAY]->(d2:Label) 
CREATE (d1)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(d2), (d2)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]-
>(d1); 
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Figure 4.3: Multi-Domain One-Way Full Trust 
 
First Violation First violation was identified through a query if an information 
flow path exists from DArmy TS to DArmy Unclassi f ied and the path was logged to 
identify how the violation was produced: 
• Find Path 
MATCH path = (:Label{UID: ‘TS’})-[:INFORMATION FLOW*]->(:Label {UID: 
‘Unclassified’})  
RETURN path; 
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Figure 4.4: Detection of First Full Trust Violation 
 
• Log Path 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘TS’})-[:INFORMATION FLOW*]->(l:Label {UID: 
‘Unclassified’}) WITH relationships(path) AS rels UNWIND rels AS rel with 
DISTINCT rel AS rel 
RETURN startNODE(rel).UID AS source, endNODE(rel).UID AS destination; 
 
Figure 4.5: Log of First Full Trust Violation 
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Second Violation Second violation was identified through a query if a 
information flow path exists from DCDC High to DCDC Low. In this case, it involved 
all nodes existing within the graph, therefore, the output looks the same as 
Figure 4.3 and the path was logged to identify how the violation was produced: 
• Find Path 
MATCH path = (:Label {UID: ‘High’})-[:INFORMATION FLOW*]->(:Label {UID: 
‘Low’}) 
RETURN path; 
 
• Log Path 
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘High’})-[:INFORMATION FLOW*]->(l:Label {UID: 
‘Low’}) WITH relationships(path) AS rels UNWIND rels AS rel with DISTINCT rel 
AS rel 
RETURN startNODE(rel).UID AS source, endNODE(rel).UID AS destination; 
 
Figure 4.6: Log of First Full Trust Violation 
 
Test Scenario (One-Way Partial Trust to Read-Only) 
One-way, partial trust (read) relationship was created in the graph 
database to depict an incorrect inter-domain relationship (Figure 4.7). However, 
the mapping of DCDC Low to DArmy Top Secret provides no concern as DArmy Top 
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Secret being able to read from DCDC Low is valid. However, a potential for an 
information leak will be observed as DArmy Unclassified is able to read from DCDC 
High. As a result of this incorrect mapping: 
• DArmy Unclassif ied is able to read from DCDC High 
• DArmy Top Secret is able to read from DCDC Low 
The following Cypher statement was utilized to simulate the inter-domain 
relationships and information flows: 
• Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC High to DArmy Unclassified  
MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘High’}), (d2:Label {UID: ’Unclassified’}) 
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIALLY  TRUSTS ONE WAY  READ ONLY]->(d2); 
• Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC Low to DArmy Top Secret 
MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘Low’}), (d2:Label {UID: ‘TS’}) 
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIALLY TRUSTS ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2); 
• Create Information Flow Between DCDC and DArmy by Utilizing the 
Wrong Mapping  
MATCH (d1:Label)-[:PARTIALLY TRUSTS ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2:Label) 
CREATE (d1)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(d2); 
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Figure 4.7: Multi-Domain One-Way Trust to Read-Only 
 
No Information Leak Detected The MLS policies were not violated within their 
domains. However, the MLS policies of D1CDC were not upheld by DArmy. The 
lowest security label in DArmy (Unclassified) can obtain classified information from 
the highest security label from DCDC (High), the entire DArmy can access classified 
information. When a query was utilized to observe all the nodes associated with 
the information flow to DArmy Unclassified, it displayed the same graph as Figure 
4.7. 
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Test Scenario (One-Way Partial Trust to Write-Only) 
One-way, partial trust (read) relationship was created in the graph 
database to depict an incorrect inter-domain relationship. However, the mapping 
of DCDC High to DArmy Unclassifiedprovides no concern as DArmy Unclassified 
being able to write to DCDC High is valid. However, a potential for an information 
leak will be observed as DArmy Top Secret is able to write to DCDC Low. As a result 
of this incorrect mapping: 
• DArmy Unclassi f ied is able to write to DCDC High 
• DArmy Top Secret is able to write to DCDC Low 
The following Cypher statement was utilized to simulate the inter-
domain relationships and information flows: 
• Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC High to DArmy Unclassified 
MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘High’}), (d2:Label {UID: ‘Unclassified’})  
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIALLY  TRUSTS ONE WAY  WRITE ONLY]->(d2); 
• Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC Low to DArmy Top Secret 
MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘Low’}), (d2:Label {UID: ‘TS’}) 
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIALLY TRUSTS ONE WAY WRITE ONLY]->(d2); 
• Create Information Flow Between DCDC and DArmy by Utilizing the 
Wrong Mapping  
MATCH (d1:Label)-[:PARTIALLY TRUSTS ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2:Label) 
CREATE (d2)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(d1); 
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Figure 4.8: Multi-Domain One-Way Trust to Write-Only 
No Information Leak Detected The MLS policies were not violated within their 
domains. However, the MLS policies of D1Army were not upheld by DCDC. The 
lowest security label in DCDC (Low) can obtain classified information from the 
highest security label from DCDC (Top Secret), the entire DCDC can access 
classified information. 
Two-Way Trust 
Similar to the one-way trust, there is a two-way trust in which both 
domains trust one another. To reduce redundancy, two-way trust will not be 
explored in the test. However, the concept will be displayed in a matrix so others 
may explore information leaks using the two-way trust concept in the future. 
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Similar to Figure 4.2, trust relationships will be marked in black and information 
flows will be marked in green. 
 
Figure 4.9: Two-Way Trust Matrix 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MLS MULTI-DOMAIN ACCESS CONTROL POLICY 
Concept of Controlled Model 
Access control between a subject and an object may also be audited by 
utilizing the graph database through several methods. In the following case, the 
audit protocol makes two assumptions are presumed to be in place when the 
audit is taking place: 
• Both parties have agreed upon a terms of trust agreement (e.g., one-way 
or two-way trust and partial or full trust) 
• Relationships are mapped correctly - no information leak 
From the assumption that the two conditions are met, a scenario with a 
skeletal model has been created to conduct the audit. Starting the model 
baseline to Figure 4.1, the [:INFORMATION FLOW ] between the security labels 
were initially taken out and more details were added for better interpretation as 
well as subjects and objects were added as an example in Figure 5.1. In this 
scenario, Tom (Resource of DNSA) and Monica (Resource of DArmy) are both 
subjects each work for an entity (labeled as “Domain”). In this instance, Tom has 
a security level of DNSA High and Monica has a security level of DArmy Secret. 
Objects were also added in this scenario, where Foreign Intel File is a resource 
of DNSA and Missile File is a resource of the DArmy to see if objects are readable 
from a subject from a different domain. The following Cypher statements were 
used to create the following model: 
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• Create correct trust mapping between DNSA and DArmy 
MATCH (d1: Label {UID: ‘High’}), (d2:  Label {UID: ‘TS’})  
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIAL  TRUST ONE WAY  READ ONLY]->(d2); 
MATCH (d1: Label {UID: ‘Low’}), (d2: Label {UID: ‘Unclassified’})  
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIAL  TRUST ONE WAY  READ ONLY]->(d2); 
• Create domain nodes 
CREATE (:Domain {UID: ‘NSA’}), (:Domain {UID: ‘Army’}) 
• Attach security labels to domains 
MATCH (d:Domain {UID: ‘NSA’}), (l:Label)  
WHERE l.UID = “High” OR l.UID= “Low” 
MATCH (d:Domain {UID: ‘Army’}), (l:Label)  
WHERE l.UID = “TS” OR l.UID = “S” OR l.UID = “Unclassified” 
CREATE (d)-[:SECURITY LABEL]->(l); 
• Create subjects Tom and Monica 
CREATE (:Subject {UID: ‘Tom’}), (:Subject {UID: ‘Monica’}) 
• Create objects Foreign Intel File and Missile File 
CREATE (:Object {UID: ‘Foreign Intel File’}), (:Object {UID: ‘Missile File’}) 
• Create relationships between subject and objects with other nodes 
MATCH (s:Subject {UID: ‘Tom’}), (d:Domain: {UID: ‘NSA’}), (l: Label {UID: 
‘High’} 
CREATE (s)-[:RESOURCE OF]->(d), (s)-[:SECURITY LEVEL]->(l); 
MATCH (s:Subject {UID: ‘Monica’}), (d:Domain: {UID: ‘Army’}), (l: Label {UID: 
‘S’} 
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CREATE (s)-[:RESOURCE OF]->(d), (s)-[:SECURITY LEVEL]->(l); 
MATCH (s:Object {UID: ‘Foreign Intel File’}), (d:Domain: {UID: ‘NSA’}), (l: Label 
{UID: ‘Low’} 
CREATE (s)-[:RESOURCE OF]->(d), (s)-[:SECURITY LEVEL]->(l); 
MATCH (s:Object {UID: ‘Missile File’}), (d:Domain: {UID: ‘Army’}), (l: Label {UID: 
‘S’} 
CREATE (s)-[:RESOURCE OF]->(d), (s)-[:SECURITY LEVEL]->(l); 
 
Figure 5.1: Skeletal Model of Scenario 
 
Substituting Relationships 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, DOMINATES and trust relationship 
may be substituted accordingly without violating the BLP security principles as 
the INFORMATION FLOW in the database. As a result, the DOMINATES and 
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PARTIAL TRUST relationship was substituted as shown in Figure 5.1 while 
subjects, objects, and domain maintain their relationships in the database. 
• Create information flow accordingly with partial trust relationship, 
while also deleting the partial trust relationship 
MATCH (d1:Label)-[rel:PARTIAL TRUST ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2:Label) 
CREATE (d1)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(d2) 
DETACH DELETE rel; 
• Create information flow accordingly with dominates relationship, 
while also deleting the dominates relationship 
MATCH (h:Label)-[rel:DOMINATES]->(l:Label)  
CREATE (l)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(h)  
DETACH DELETE rel; 
 
Figure 5.2: Model of Scenario 
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Query of Access Control Policy 
There are two scenarios generated with this model. The first scenario will 
prove that a query is possible for one subject to access another object in an inter-
domain setting. The second scenario is generated to prove that the integrity of 
the overall access control policy is maintained in the graph database. 
 
Scenario 1 In this scenario, a situation arises where information contained in a 
file from the National Security Agency was compromised and an internal audit 
has proven it was not compromised from a subject within the same domain; but 
there is a suspicion that Monica from the Army might be behind the leak. The 
question is “Is it possible for Monica (DArmy) to read the Foreign Intel File (DNSA)?” 
This question can be directly queried in the graph database. As shown in Figure 
5.3, Information was able to flow from DNSA Low, which was the Foreign Missile 
File’s security label, to Unclassified (DArmy)and from Unclassified (DArmy) to Secret 
(DArmy), which is a security clearance Monica has. 
• Querying the suspect 
MATCH clearance = (s:Subject {UID: ‘Monica’})-[rel:SECURITY LEVEL]-
>(sl1:Label), classification = (o:Object {UID: ‘Foreign Intel File’})-[:SECURITY 
LEVEL]->(sl2:Label), path = (sl2)-[:INFORMATION FLOW*]->(sl1) 
RETURN clearance, classification, path; 
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Figure 5.3: Successful Query 
 
Scenario 2 Continuing the scenario story line from scenario 1, Army also found 
their confidential missile file (DArmy) in the public. The only internal suspect is 
Monica (DArmy),however, if the Army wanted to rule out the fact it might have 
been leaked through subject Tom from the National Security Agency, it can ask 
the database a similar question, “Is it possible for Tom (DNSA) to read the Foreign 
Intel File (DArmy)?”. However, in this case, there is no path for Army’s confidential 
files to reach the NSA domain since there was only a one-way read agreement, 
thus maintaining the integrity of the agreement intact. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
Conclusion 
Graph databases may be utilized to implement, monitor, and audit MLS 
policies from a single domain to multi-domains. This conclusion was reached 
after leveraging Bell-LaPadula’s security principles and trust relationships with 
the flow of information within the lattice structure. Not only can the database 
detect errors in the implemented policy, but can also give researchers the ability 
to log the path it took to reach a certain end point to rectify the modeling problem 
or an agreement that the policy writer made. Modeling the MLS policies in the 
database can provide a means to formalize written security policies. 
Future Work 
According to Needham and Hodler, 2019, three algorithms can be 
explored in a graph database: path finding, centrality, and community detection 
algorithms. Out of the three algorithms mentioned, centrality algorithm may be 
one of the most useful algorithms that can be explored in a graph database for 
security purposes. The variety of centrality algorithm may be explored to detect 
the most critical nodes in respect to MLS policy or networked systems. As a 
result, officials responsible for the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information may be able to allocate proper amount of finite resources to 
safeguard the systems or information. 
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Furthermore, there may be work to be done on path finding algorithm. 
Path finding algorithm could not be utilized properly in this thesis due to not 
having any numerical values on the relationship. When there is a “cost” assigned 
to a relationship between several nodes, path finding algorithm may be able to 
calculate the shortest path to get to a certain resource and save time and 
resource for a subject on a domain. For example, there are many paths a subject 
in TS {Bio, Nuke} can read the resources in S {} in Figure 3.7, however, it is not 
certain all those paths are efficient. Therefore, path finding algorithm may provide 
some assistance in designing an efficient MLS policy. 
 
Figure 6.1: Reference of Figure 4.3 
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Another future work that may be done is on the analysis of the two-way 
trust mechanism. Although the concept is similar between a one-way trust 
agreement, two-way trust far complicates and makes the information flow much 
more intricate. The graph database may be able to help detect errors from 
implementing MLS policies that may have been proven to be viable. 
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